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THE EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY ORDER IN EUROPE: IMPORTANCE OF
MULTINATIONAL FORCES

BY

Colonel Fabrizio Castagnetti
Italian Army

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**THE EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY ORDER IN EUROPE: IMPORTANCE OF
MULTINATIONAL FORCES**

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

By

**Colonel Fabrizio Castagnetti
Italian Army**

**Colonel Phillip W. Mock
Project Adviser**

**U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013**

ABSTRACT

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THE EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY ORDER IN EUROPE: IMPORTANCE OF MULTINATIONAL FORCES

INTRODUCTION

The events which began in November 1989 in East Germany and rapidly moved, in a dramatic continuum, to the very midst of the Soviet Empire have radically changed the reality and perspectives of European security. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the conclusion of the CFE treaty on conventional forces and the progressive withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Central Europe have substantially altered the nature of the East-West military confrontation. Now, the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union seem to put an end to the ideological fight between democracy and "real socialism", introducing a political variable of tremendous impact for the Continent as well for the entire world. The bipolar strategic order that has kept the peace in Europe for 45 years is over, and a new era of great hope and uncertainty has begun.

Two broad schools of thought have emerged about the consequences for Post-Cold War Europe. The pessimists think that the resulting system will suffer all the problems common to multipolar societies, naturally more unstable than the bipolar ones. They argue that Germany may return to a course of aggressive expansionism, once it is free from the police presence of the superpowers, and that the post-communist regimes in Central Europe may evolve into "praetorian" or hyper-nationalist states, instead of

developing Western-style democracies. Again, as the situation in Yugoslavia suggests, the virulent ethnic hatreds and latent border conflicts might re-emerge in the countries of Central, Southeastern, and Eastern Europe as well as among the nationalities inside other republics of the former Soviet Union¹. The optimists, on the other hand, argue that some form of collective security will be established and will preserve peace. They base their assumptions on the following considerations: (1) The constantly increasing degree of interdependence between states, especially in the economic field, will make war almost impossible. (2) There is the possibility, as demonstrated by the Gulf War, of a new and greater role of the United Nations based on international law. (3) Liberal democracies very seldom fight wars against each other. (4) The Europeans have learned from the disastrous experiences of two world wars in 25 years that military conflict can no longer be considered a sensible means to achieve national goals.²

These views appear extreme, based as they are not only on different assumptions but also on diverging perspectives of human and nation-states relations (reality, pragmatism and deductive considerations of the teachings of history on one side; more liberal, philosophic and faithful vision on the other). Nonetheless they give proof that the end of the well defined antagonism between two worlds and two absolute concepts, democracy and totalitarianism, has left the field to a more uncertain and complex competition: a diffused contest between forces of integration (communications revolution, economic interdependence, collective

security and free flow of ideas) and forces of fragmentation (resurgent nationalism, economic protectionism, re-emergence of latent border conflicts, ethnic hatreds, religious fundamentalism and wealth differences).³ Of course, many of these forces were also present in the Cold-War era, but they remained suppressed. Now they are free to develop their negative potentials as "plagues from Pandora's box" once the dissolution of the Soviet Empire lifted the lid.⁴ Indeed, there is no new order at the moment, but only an "opportunity or an aspiration" that has to be developed and implemented.⁵

This study will first analyze the risks or threats to peace in Europe that exist after the defeat of the "East Pole". Next it will provide an estimate of the European security architecture likely to develop over the next decade to meet the new requirements. And finally, it will assess the importance of the constitution of multinational forces within the European defense and security institutions as pragmatic means of military and political integration.

NEW SECURITY CONCERNs

The former Soviet Union

The Soviet Union has perhaps reached the final phase of its process of economic and political decomposition. As a paradox, the triumph of liberalism has had profoundly disintegrative consequences. Of the former 15 republics, three --Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia-- have been internationally recognized as independent

states and may be considered in every respect part of the new East Europe. Lithuania and Latvia have reopened the embassies they had before the Second World War, while Estonia has an office --as do Ukraine and Byelorussia-- by the UN Headquarters. Of the remaining twelve, eleven have joined the formation of the new Commonwealth of Independent States (signed in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan on December 21, 1991). Together with the resignation of Gorbachev as President of the Soviet Union, this has definitively sanctioned the end of the USSR as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality. The last republic --Georgia--, which declared independence of Moscow but did not join the commonwealth, is temporarily ruled by a military junta, since the authoritarian but legitimate President Gamsakhurdia has been ousted by political opposition forces. From this latter southern republic, whose eventual request to join later the commonwealth is subject to a peaceful solution of the internal problems, the troops of the former Soviet Union and Interior Ministry have been withdrawn.⁶

The agreement on establishment of the commonwealth leave all the problems of the disintegrating Soviet Union open. The first concern derives from the incredible mix of nationalities, cultures, and religions that characterizes the huge territory. The Soviet Union had seen, especially under Stalin, forced migrations of entire peoples, deportations, poorly defined inter-republic borders and minorities submerged into the mosaic of the Russian populations; all in order to silence the nationalistic movements and, so, strengthen the unity of the empire. "The intermingling of

nationalities is such that some 64 million people (24 percent of the entire population, totaling 262 million and composed of 104 different nationalities) either live outside their home republic, or are among the 89 small nationalities with no republic of their own.⁷ Everywhere, now, the new freedom shows the traits of intolerance, typical of every national redemption. One example that gives a clear idea of the level of social disintegration is the situation in Moldavia. In this small country, located between Rumania and Ukraine, three ethnic groups are striving toward completely different goals. The majority of the population, of Rumanian origin and language, wants full independence or even the reunification with the old fatherland. Of the remaining two minorities, one (Russians) would prefer to be united with Russia (with no territorial contiguity), while the other (christians of Turkish origin) would like greater autonomy, if not independence from Moldavia.⁸

Despite the threat of definitive collapse of the economy, this issue has been virtually ignored by the Alma-Ata agreement. In fact, also in the economic field the damages of the Stalin era have been, if not irreversible, very serious. By imposing ties between industrial suppliers and industrial producers without any regard for geography and distance, and by ordering vast regional single cultivations Stalin has --de facto-- prevented the economic self-sufficiency of the republics.⁹ Therefore, it would have been necessary to agree some form of common market and economic community similar to the EC, instead of the generic language about

cooperation and common economic space adopted in the text of the agreement. Without a strong economy and sufficient welfare, ethnic strifes, similar to the bloody violence in the Armenian-inhabited enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, are likely to spread within other republics of the commonwealth and in Georgia.

Another issue that remains uncertain is the nuclear arms control. A joint command of strategic forces has been agreed, but no firm date has been given for dismantling nuclear weapons in Byelorussia and Kazakhstan. In Ukraine, the short-range tactical nuclear weapons should be destroyed by July 1, 1992, and strategic weapons by the end of 1994.¹⁰ If the nuclear dilemma represents a "nightmare" in this climate of political instability, the persisting potential in conventional arms is also cause for worry. Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldavia have decided to establish independent conventional armies on the basis of the ex-Soviet forces still stationed on their territory. All the other eight republics should keep their units under a single command, while reserving the right to form national guard formations.¹¹ With these premises, even after implementation of the Conventional Forces Treaty (also uncertain), Russia will retain a formidable conventional military capability for the foreseeable future, which underlines the continuing need for collective Western defense to balance such capability.

A further area of concern derives from the relations between Russia and the other republics. The preeminence of Russia, that accounts for more than half of the population of the commonwealth

and three-quarters of its land mass, has been recognized internationally --by considering Russia as the successor State of the Soviet Union-- and also internally, by agreeing that Russia be given the permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Nevertheless, there are increasing contrasts regarding, for example, the ownership of the Black sea fleet (claimed by Ukraine and Russia) or the simple share of ex-Soviet properties inside the commonwealth and abroad.

To sum up, if no one can foresee with certainty what will happen next in the former Soviet Union, some risks or threats are due to remain whatever new configuration results from the collapsing system. These risks are related to the economic fragility which, together with ethnic conflicts and territorial disputes within and among the republics, can cause mass emigrations of unprecedented magnitude, and the massive military potential, both nuclear and conventional. Only the threat of a sudden, massive offensive against Central and Western Europe appears impossible, since such attempt would require a preparation that can not be concealed.

On the other hand, the process towards democratization added to the political instability and the economic crisis may also have some positive effects for international stability. In fact, since Russia will necessarily remain for the next future inward-looking and need the support of the Western industrialized countries in order to change its economic structure, there is the possibility of a greater cooperation of the Security Council and, so, of a bigger

role of the United Nations as a whole in maintaining or restoring peace. Also, international recognition of the new political subjects has been connected, among other criteria, with the abidance by international arms control nuclear non proliferation agreements. This makes likely, in the near-term, far-reaching arms negotiations with the United States and NATO. Significant, in this regard, is the fact that, after the recent visit of the ex-Soviet Union by Secretary of State Baker, the first republics to be recognized as independent states have been those owning strategic nuclear weapons (Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, and Kazakhstan).¹²

Central and Southeastern Europe¹³

The foreign policy of the former members of the Warsaw Pact is characterized, with some exception for Rumania and Bulgaria, by the common effort to promote good relations with the West in all fields--political, military and economic--while distancing themselves from the former Soviet Union. This effort is reflected in the requests for future membership in the EC and NATO and in some sub-regional political and economic alignments (the Central European Group comprising the CSFR, Hungary and Poland; the Pentagonal formed by the three former countries plus Italy and Yugoslavia) designed to cushion the impact of decreased links with the Russian power and to ease the breakthrough into Western Europe.¹⁴ Yet, to say that these countries are a closed block would be simplistic and mistaken. Indeed, they suffer the same contradictions as the republics of the former Soviet Union, such as

potential border disputes (between Poland and Lithuania, Byelorussia and Ukraine; Poland and CSFR; Hungary and CSFR) and the presence of ethnic pockets that may either seek independence or be claimed by other countries (Rumanians in Moldavian Bessarabia; Hungarians in Romania, Czechoslovakia and Ukraine). The same problems face the Southeastern countries (polemics between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia over Macedonia; discontent between Bulgaria and Turkey over the Turkish minority in Bulgaria; harassment of the Albanian minority in the Yugoslav area of Kosovo; long-dormant conflict between Greece and Turkey).

The situation in Yugoslavia and Albania deserves its own consideration. In Yugoslavia the end of the Cold-War and the dissolution of Tito's legacy have already caused the outburst of long-standing conflicts. The separatist tendencies of Slovenia and Croatia, culminating in a declaration of independence from one side (recognized by EC on January 15, 1992) and the upsurge of Serbian nationalism on the other, has brought the country to the edge of civil war. The antagonism in Yugoslavia has deep historical roots. Croatia and Slovenia are largely Roman Catholic and had been under Hasburg rule; Serbia and the other southern regions had been under Ottoman control and profess by and large different creeds. Nearly two million Serbs live outside of Serbia's borders, most of them in Croatia (600,000) and Herzegovina. During World War II, Croat-Serb animosity exploded into some of the most vicious violence of all times. Finally, Slovenia comprises only 8 percent of Yugoslavia's population but produces nearly 20 percent of the country's national

product. After Slovenia, Croatia is the most wealthy republic. The bloody fights between the Croatian militia and the Serbian guerrillas, backed up by the Serb-dominated federal armed forces, are not likely to spark a world war but their intensification could hinder the process of democratization in Eastern Europe and pose a serious threat to European security.¹⁵

In Albania, the collapse of communism and the restoration of some form of individual freedom have originated what may well become a major threat to the overall stability of Europe: waves and waves of desperate men have left the country, toward Italy and a better life. The emergency has been worked out with some difficulties, by repatriating most of the refugees and granting strong economic aid. Still the Albanian situation gives an idea of what may happen if the refugee phenomenon should affect countries with much larger populations than small Albania.

The Reunification of Germany

British Trade and Industry Minister Nicholas Ridley was fired by former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in mid-July 1990 for expressing fears that a united Germany may return to a sort of aggressive behavior. Indeed this new country, due to its combined population of 80 million, its economic power and its dominant geographical position in the center of Europe, has the potential to challenge existing balances. While its overall role is due to increase, Germany will remain "the West's front-line state, if no longer against a Soviet military threat then certainly against an eastern block of poverty and economic confusion".¹⁶ The

reunification of Germany has not succeeded with no cost at all: in some extent it has been "paid" with the renunciation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and cuts in conventional forces (as part of CFE negotiations) that exceeds in percentage those of all the other nations involved.¹⁷ In the actual period of great instability and transition and with NATO undergoing a deep review of its strategy, the security issue is fundamental for Germany. If this security will not be perceived in the future as guaranteed by a credible European system (revised NATO or Western European Union or European Community with independent defense capabilities), no other alternative would be left to Germany than to guarantee itself, unilaterally.¹⁸ In this context is to be seen the strong will of Chancellor Kohl to speed up the process of political integration of the EC and the recent German-French proposal of joint forces.¹⁹

The Middle East

The Gulf War has once again proved that the most demanding challenge to European vital interests, out of the NATO area of operations, will increasingly come from the Middle East. This area is a concentration of religious and political antagonism, natural resources and weapons of mass destruction. If the threat from Iraq has been temporarily put aside, the military potential of some countries is cause for great concern. Egypt, Israel and Syria have more tanks than France, Germany and Great Britain, even without taking in account the reductions agreed upon in the CFE treaty. Capacities in the field of chemical warfare are available in Iraq.

Iran, Egypt and, most probably, in Libya.²⁰ Israel is supposed to have nuclear warheads and the political determination to use them, should they constitute the last resort to defend the existence of the country.²¹ Any conflict in the region could threaten again the free access to the oil-rich Persian Gulf. This would represent for Europe, out of any rhetoric about common values, the only vital interest for which a military intervention in the region is not only possible but very likely.

North-South Economic Disparity, Terrorism, Drugs

These issues do not pose threats of a significant military nature, yet, they work as disintegrative factors within and among States. The international community has been unable so far to find ways to eradicate the causes of the problems or limit their destructive effects. Indeed, the difference in living standards between rich Western European countries and poor African nations seems to become greater and greater, generating again waves of immigration, both legal and illegal, at a rate disproportional to the speed of cultural assimilation.²² Combined with the high unemployment level on the continent and the refusal of Muslim refugees to assimilate, virtually every European country is seeing a rise of anti-immigrant sentiment.

POSSIBLE ARCHITECTURE OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY

A realistic approach to a possible security order should be based on the objective evaluation of facts rather than intentions. Intentions, in fact, can change during a night or, said with other

words, the absence of an immediate threat does not mean that there is no threat at all.

The most impending dangers to the political stability of Europe are the conflicts connected with ethnic and border disputes. These conflicts cause immediate waves of political refugees which, added to the economic immigration from poorer countries, contribute to erode the already precarious social equilibrium of many Western societies. Over the mid-term, the same conflicts, if not stopped, could spread westward, giving the Western states a major stake in preserving peace. Yet, these threats are not the most dangerous from a military point of view. The Russians' expected retention of impressive military forces, both conventional and unconventional, must be counterbalanced with a Western European defense entity capable of deterring any major threat. The same forces should be used to prevent or contain intra-regional conflicts in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe.

To counter these risks and other threats originating outside Europe, a complex of organizations is needed, with the capability to: (1) Eliminate the ethnic and border disputes, or dampen their dangerous effects. (2) Provide the financial aid and economic relationship necessary to ease the process of the former communist countries toward full and irreversible democratization. (3) Provide nuclear and conventional deterrence and defense against a possible resurgence of a Russian military threat. (4) Avoid renationalization of European armies. (5) Provide some collaborative structure for Western security ties with the former

members of the Warsaw Pact and all the other countries with full sovereign statehood which originated from the disintegration of the Soviet empire. (6)Furnish the necessary support to the United States, both political and military, in case of direct interventions aimed at the protection of interests considered vital for the Western Hemisphere. Do these organizations exist? If yes, what changes are needed to meet the challenges?. A plausible reply to these questions can be found by examining the institutions available and their capacity to accomplish the needed tasks. Finally, the required changes will be assessed.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

The CSCE is a framework for security, stability, and cooperation. It focuses on three major issues: political-military confidence building measures, human rights (individuals and minorities), and scientific, cultural, and educational cooperation. With its 48 members (all European countries, including all former republics of the Soviet Union, except Georgia, plus Turkey, the United States and Canada), this organization is the natural forum in which all states with vital interests in Europe can have their concerns addressed. In its present form, however, CSCE has neither the capability nor the credibility to perform its potential tasks. In fact, each of its 48 members has an equal vote and, therefore, any action requires unanimity. It is wholly unrealistic that major nuclear powers would abdicate elements of basic national security prerogative to such a body. Further, CSCE has just entered the first step in the process of institutionalization. As a result of

the Charter of Paris signed in November 1990, all the signatories have agreed to establish some political structures and institutions such as: a Council of Foreign Ministers, a permanent secretariat (in Prague), a Conflict Prevention Center (in Vienna), and other minor committees.²³

European Community (EC)

The EC, founded in 1957 with the signing of the Treaty of Rome, includes 12 countries, all but one of which (Ireland) are also members of NATO.²⁴ Taken as a whole, the EC has a population of 325 million and a GNP similar to that of the United States. The primary goal of the EC, whose the major institutions are the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, is to increase the economic and political integration among its 12 members. A main step toward this goal will be the creation of a single, integrated market by the end of 1992. Another planned action, as agreed upon during the recent meeting at Maastricht (Netherlands, 9-10 December 1991), is the creation of a single currency and a regional central bank at the latest by January 1, 1999. Since mid-1989, the EC has played a key coordinating role for Western assistance to Eastern Europe, including, now, the Soviet Union.

The EC, as proved by its failure in brokering a successful cease-fire in Yugoslavia, can be considered an "economic giant with clay feet," or a "paper tiger." Economic and diplomatic sanctions, not accompanied by agreed military measures, have miserably failed to stop the bloodshed between Serbs and Croats. This important issue was addressed in the Maastricht summit. Although earlier

plans to identify the Community "federal" vocation have been, for the time being, abandoned (by will of Great Britain), it was agreed to establish "common foreign and security policies with a view to increasing their influence on the world stage. That policy will be defined by unanimity, although the governments can also decide by unanimity that political aspects of a specific policy can be implemented through a two-thirds majority."²⁵ The governments decided also, for the first time, to work "toward the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense."²⁶ Although these steps appear reassuring and Chancellor Kohl has defined the new process of European unification "irreversible", there is no doubt that the way will be very gradual and painful.

In this context, the most important challenge facing the EC is how it can accommodate the requests of the countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which have already applied for full EC membership (Austria and Sweden), and meet the economic needs of the emerging democracies in Central Europe (Poland, CSFR, and Hungary), that are seeking at least special association pacts with the Community, while achieving the necessary integration in the security and defense issues.

Council of Europe

The Council of Europe, created in 1949, is formed by 26 countries and covers practically all aspects of European society except defense (human rights, social and economic issues, culture and sport, heritage and environment, etc.).²⁷ Its principal

institutions are the Committee of Foreign Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly and the Secretary General with permanent secretariat. The Council of Europe derives its significance from two principal characteristics. First, it is a supranational organ in the sense that its jurisdiction in matters such as the human rights and personal freedom supersedes the jurisdiction on the national level. Second, membership certifies democratic status and, so, qualifies for inclusion and participation in other organizations of European integration.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

NATO is a governmental organization established by the 1949 Treaty of Washington. It has the aim to safeguard the freedom and the common heritage and civilization of its members. The determination and cohesion of the Alliance, which had been of extreme importance in the winning of the Cold War, may also play a significant role in the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe, in strict concert with other fundamental institutions. In particular, while implementing the revision of its overall strategy, as stated in the London Declaration of 5-6 July 1990, NATO can continue to provide the security frame in which CSCE may speed its "institutionalization" process and the EC its political integration.¹⁸ Whether NATO would serve as an "insurance policy" against uncertainty will depend on the will of the major powers in Europe as well as the United States. In this regard, the results reached in the recent summit in Rome (7-8 November 1991), although not dissipating persistent differences of view between

France and the U.S., have undoubtedly clarified that the development of a European security identity is complementary to NATO and not opposite to it.²⁹ At the declaratory level, not only the sixteen members of the Alliance but also the former Warsaw Pact countries still consider NATO as the continent's most effective guarantor of peace and stability.

Western European Union (WEU)

The WEU is a governmental organization established by the 1948 Brussels Treaty and altered by the 1954 Paris Agreements.³⁰ Formed by 9 countries, all NATO and EC members, its principal purposes are to: (1) reaffirm the faith in fundamental human rights and preserve the principles of democracy; (2) strengthen the economic, social and cultural ties between the member states; and (3) afford military assistance to each other in resisting any aggression. WEU relies on a Council of Foreign and Defense Ministers, an assembly and various committees. Originally designed to hedge against German rearmament, WEU was a dormant organization until 1984. In fact, its security functions were preempted by NATO after the Federal Republic's entry into the Alliance. Recently, the evolution of the strategic situation in Europe, the coalition war against Iraq, and the unresolved issue of NATO out-of-area contingencies have increased the importance of the WEU and highlighted its potential to play a greater role in the future security equation. This, principally for three reasons: (1) It is the only existing military institution which can provide an immediate organizational defense arm to EC. (2) It has no geographic limitations; significant in this context

is the coordination of European forces played by WEU in the two last crises in the Persian Gulf. (3) It is the natural forum where France and Spain, not integrated in the NATO military structure, can pursue military integration with other European members of the Alliance. In this regard, at the already mentioned Maastricht EC summit, it has been decided to authorize WEU to elaborate and implement Community decisions on defense issues. Those should anyway be compatible with existing commitments to NATO.

Independent European Program Group (IEPG)

Permanently located in Portugal, this group comprises all NATO members except the U.S., Canada, and Iceland. IEPG, being independent and having the goal to promote armament cooperation among European nations, can be considered a body paralleling the European economic integration in an area that, so far, has received unsufficient attention.

Eurogroup

This informal NATO sub-group, which comprises all European members of the Alliance except France and Iceland, serves as a forum for Defense Ministers to discuss security issues and to increase American understanding of European burden-sharing. As such, it has the potential to become one of the building blocks of the future "European pillar".

After this brief look at the existing organizations, it seems appropriate to conclude that the means which can help reach the goal of lasting security in Europe are already available. The problem is the way: how can these bodies be transformed and

eventually melded to perform the task? The purpose of steady security and political stability can be realized with the creation of a European Confederation or, better, the United States of Europe. But this is the long-term vision; reality looks much different: while Western Europe moves slowly toward greater integration and multilateral coordination, Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, as well as the Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, face vast political fragmentation, economic difficulties, and a general "re-nationalization" of politics. A final result of European identity in security and defense can, therefore, only be reached with a gradual and cautious multidimensional process.

Since it is impossible to remove the causes of political fragmentation--such as ethnic and border conflicts--the main effort of the Western countries, directed at dampening the risks that originate from instability, should focus on economic aid. In fact, there is no doubt that only in a condition of economic sufficiency can the level of democratization reach the point of "no return". Ethnic and religious differences may lose most of their dangerousness in conditions which meet the primary needs of food, clothes and a warm roof. The economic help that can be efficiently provided by the EC, however, is not sufficient. The crisis in Yugoslavia has proven that economic and diplomatic sanctions are no deterrent for hyper-nationalist militias.

The lack of military options has frustrated all the peacekeeping efforts of the European community. A credible military

arm can theoretically be formed within WEU, since all its members belong also to the EC and NATO. To fulfil this goal, two actions seem necessary: First, France and Great Britain should change their focus of effort from the achievement of national objectives to the good of all Europe; Second, the same countries, together with Germany and Italy, ought to realize that with the progressive withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe it is imperative for them to take a stand in the security and defense matters which fully reflects the politico-economic realities. In fact, if the interests of building a strong and reliable West European defense prevail, it will be necessary for the two European nuclear countries --as a logical relation of cause-effect-- to modify their traditional preoccupation with national sovereignty, autonomy of decision and freedom of action on security issues.

Further, if the level of prosperity of the EC is comparable to that of the U.S. and its population is larger, also the burden-sharing for global security should be more equitable.³¹ At the moment WEU can only be a "bridge" between NATO and EC, able to carry out guidelines from the European Community heads of state outside the NATO area of operations or sphere of competence (Middle East, Africa, Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe), while strengthening the European voice within the Alliance. The American fear, expressed by President Bush at the recent NATO summit in Rome (5-6 November, 1991) that a WEU caucus, under direct control of the EC, could form a bloc that might split the Alliance is at least excessive. NATO can dissolve only if the U.S., Great Britain, and

Canada withdraw all their military forces from Germany/Europe or if the European continental allies push the "peace-dividend" process so far, to reduce their share of the economic and social costs connected with collective security to a level that would be perceived as unacceptable by the U.S.

The efforts aimed at a closer coordination of Western European political initiatives and at the creation of a military instrument that can implement these initiatives do not go in this direction. On the contrary, they finally take into consideration the "out-of-area" challenges which are likely to characterize the 1990's and, consequently, recognize the necessity of a new regional security consciousness. A stronger and more effective WEU, with a distinct institutional identity but not under the direct control of the EC, is in the interest of Western Europe and of the United States.³² Some practical actions that can substantially demonstrate that NATO and WEU will be complementary and make it easier for Washington to adjust to the development of the WEU, are already at hand and must only be implemented: (1) The consolidation in Brussels, home of the European Community and NATO, of the headquarters of the WEU, currently divided between Paris (Assembly) and London (Secretariat). (2) The "dual-hatting" (NATO and WEU) of the ambassadors already accredited to the Alliance and of other officials (at the moment, the WEU permanent representatives are the members' ambassadors to Great Britain). (3) The creation of a staff with the task of planning the use of NATO forces, corresponding to WEU member countries, for out-of-area contingencies. (4) The

creation of a WEU rapid deployment force.

Diplomatic and military initiatives could also be taken by CSCE. In particular, multinational peacekeeping forces could be deployed to prevent border and ethnic conflicts, to circumscribe fighting, or to enforce a cease-fire. But, once again, a stronger position of the major European nations (in concert with Russia and the U.S.) will be necessary, up to the point of seriously considering the creation of a sort of European Security Council.³³ This process should gradually tend at the transformation of the CSCE into a "mini but more efficient UN of the Western World". In fact, this body would in some extent possess what had been lacking to the League of Nations and the absence of which has always prevented the UN from serving as a more credible world parliament: "a minimum of cultural unity and consensus, derived by a common civilization."³⁴ While speeding the institutionalization of CSCE, the political integration of the EC, and the transformation of the WEU into an efficient European military instrument, NATO --the only existing security organization capable of managing the epochal change in Europe-- should continue to perform its fundamental tasks: (1) provide the indispensable foundations for the framework in which the other mentioned organizations can peacefully grow; (2) serve as a transatlantic forum for allied consultations on any vital issues; (3) defend and deter against any threat or aggression against the territory of any NATO member state; and (4) preserve the strategic balance within Europe.

IMPORTANCE OF MULTINATIONAL FORCES

The conclusions reached about the possible architecture of the European security have highlighted the importance of a multidimensional system in which four organizations (EC, NATO, WEU and CSCE) will play a fundamental role in strict correlation. Three of them, in this period of transition and great uncertainty, must respectively maintain (NATO), improve (WEU), and possibly acquire (CSCE) a military relevance. This relevance, in a time of diminishing threat, increasing cuts in national military budgets and need to foster greater international and regional consensus, can only be achieved with a multinational approach and the ability to operate militarily in concert. In this context, if a European army is currently unfeasible, every effort should nevertheless be made for the constitution of Multinational Forces with integrated commands in peacetime. And this, not only within NATO but also in the framework of WEU and, eventually, CSCE.

Within NATO

All members of the Alliance have repeatedly stated the necessity to maintain NATO's cohesion and credibility. An essential factor to this objective is the continued U.S. presence in Europe. In particular, American units based on the old continent are fundamental to: (1) Guarantee the preservation of a strategic balance in Europe. (2) Link the military forces of the European member states of the alliance --especially those that have no nuclear status-- to the U.S. strategic arsenal. (3) Maintain a forward, already organized "staging area" in case of new possible

operations in the Middle East, the area of greatest strategic interest for the Europeans and of biggest concern for its unresolved global problems.

Nevertheless, this clear declaratory intent alone does not eliminate the existence of forces that work for the dissolution of NATO cohesion. When in the mid 1990's the last soldier of the former Soviet Union will have left Germany, it is not unrealistic to foresee strong pressure from leftist organizations, both in Germany and the United States, requesting the complete withdrawal of the American forces from Europe. This will certainly happen if the upper re-deployment of military units will go along with the strengthening of the democratization process in Central, Southeastern Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States that has replaced the USSR. At that time, the American soldiers must be embedded and integrated in NATO multinational formations in such a way that their presence would be perceived by the local population as a "normal", indissoluble part of the European security system.

Of course the Alliance has perceived, since the London meeting of July 1990, this factor as an important element of the new strategy, but its implementation has been delayed by political contests over the role of WEU and the operational concepts of the new NATO strategy. France for example, although it has been participating in the work of the NATO Strategy Review Group since early 1991, stayed completely out of the process of creation of more integrated forces, started with the May 1991 DPC decision.

Later, the same country argued that the agreed new force structure was completely illogical because it had been determined prior to the definition of a grand strategy. This national approach toward NATO, however, did not prevent France itself to announce, some months later, plans for a joint French-German military force within WEU, whose organization and strategy are also to be re-defined.³⁵ Also the French fear that the constitution of a European Rapid Reaction Force within the Atlantic Alliance could be seen as an attempt by the "Anglo-Saxons" to allow NATO to operate out-of-area under the WEU mantle is purely academic. Forces assigned to NATO have already been employed outside the Alliance's area of operations when particular situations so demanded.³⁶ The political relevance of multinational formations is much more important now than the usual different French and U.S./Great Britain concepts about possible extension of the NATO geographical boundaries.

Also considerations of pure military efficiency should be considered of limited importance. Some military officials have called multinational formations "impracticable nonsense". They are shortsighted, although their objections are based on real difficulties especially in regard to logistical integration.³⁷

The creation of multinational units may be considered now the most pragmatic and easy way to maintain NATO's cohesion and political credibility: an objective that is essential until the creation of a more reliable European collective security regime. The benefits of such process are not only of a political nature. First, military multinationalism will undoubtedly increase the

interoperability within NATO, necessary to allied armed forces to operate efficiently in theater , as well to project military power outside Europe if so required and agreed upon. In a period of austere defense budgets and great pressure toward reconversion of industrial plants from a pure military to civilian use, there is the possibility and the opportunity of greater integration in the fields of research, development, and production of military equipment. The final solution of this process of standardization of weapons systems being the long-term creation of a "pole" of industries --not necessary belonging to all the member states-- to be realized in Europe parallel to the overall economic and political integration and tied to the U.S. and Canada by special agreements.

Second, the creation of multinational formations will hopefully result in a more fair burden sharing between the Alliance's member states. Let's take, for example, the case of Italy. One of the seven most industrialized countries in the world, Italy has not given a military contribution to the security of Europe consistent with its economic potential, relying to a great extent on the huge American presence in Europe and on NATO as a whole. The planned withdrawal of half of the U.S. forces is a cause for a possible increase of the Italian defense contribution beyond the political support that has always been relevant (two of the most important steps taken by the Italian government being the approval --in 1982-- of the deployment of cruise missiles in Sicily and the recent decision in favor of the re-deployment to Italy of

one U.S. F-16 fighter wing stationed in Spain). At the moment, Italy spends for its armed forces approximately 1.7 % of its internal gross product, including the expenditures needed for the "Carabinieri" who perform primarily police duties under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This budget has made possible the maintenance of a relatively large military instrument, but based to a great extent --especially for the Army-- on conscripts and poor military equipment. The lack of professional forces and the fear of internal political turmoil in case of losses of draftees in combat operations, has prevented the Army from taking part, together with the Navy and the Air Force, to the Gulf war. Maintaining the same level of budgeting commitment it seems now possible, while reducing the size of the Army, to adopt all the measures necessary to transform the actual structure into a more professional one. For sure, also the Italian political establishment, traditionally poorly disposed to deal with security problems, would not accept that the five brigades made available for the constitution of multinational formations would possess an operational capacity inferior to that of similar units of countries comparable to Italy, such as Germany and Great Britain. This should mean not only a considerable leap forward toward a complete professional Army, which is felt necessary, but also an overall equipment modernization and rationalization of the Command, Control and Communication systems.

A third benefit could be the reduction of the costs of the U.S. forward deployment in Europe, by "delegating" non-essential

service support requirements (such as laundry and bath, water supply, engineering functions, etc.) among allied forces in place.³⁸

A further advantage of multinational corps would be the opportunity to redeploy some of the remaining U.S. forces in Europe from Germany to the southern flank. The U.S. combat ground forces based at the moment in the AFSOUTH area of operations consist only of a single airborne battalion stationed in Vicenza (Italy), earmarked for contingency operations as a part of the AMF (Land), and of a helicopter squadron (CH-47, also in Vicenza). These units could be easily increased to form an airmobile regiment or brigade of the planned new Immediate Reaction Force. As for the necessary infrastructures, it would be possible to utilize, with minimal costs, those already available in northern Italy, since the ongoing reduction of 25% of the Italian Army has focused especially on units stationed in that part of the country.

Finally, a last benefit could be seen in a better specialization of roles between the various allies. This is not a new idea, having been addressed in a burden-sharing report, approved by the NATO Military Committee in December 1988.³⁹ The implementation of such an idea, however, has always been postponed since it would have unbalanced the military structures of the countries involved. Now, in the frame of European integration and in view of continuing reductions of resources as well as increasing costs -- necessary to keep a sufficient technological level of weapons systems--, it might become inevitable, at least for those

NATO members whose armed forces are already relatively small.

Based on all these considerations, the creation of NATO Army multinational formations have high priority and should be processed without further delays. "Multinationality" in the other services (Navy and Air Forces) has already evolved to some degree and, although more consideration is appropriate, it will not be addressed in this study. Besides, the inherent flexibility of air and maritime forces, common procedures, and high levels of equipment compatibility make possible the timely and efficient concentration of multinational air and naval power also on an "ad hoc" basis.

The army formations should include:

- An Immediate Reaction Force (IRF), light and with high readiness, possibly based on the existing ACE Mobile Force (AMF-L). It should incorporate all Allies at whatever level they can afford and have a broad range of tasks: (1) demonstrate Alliance resolve in peacetime deterrence deployments, showing the maximum number of Allies flags as a political signal of unity and risk sharing; (2) serve as advanced detachment of a more powerful Reaction Force in particular crises; (3) fight alongside other NATO forces as required. Only the employment in disaster relief operations should be considered exceptional, because of limited transportation, medical, and engineer assets.
- A Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), at Corps level, with greater combat power, still at high readiness and light enough to

achieve rapid ACE-wide deployment. It could be brought into action to prevent a crisis from developing into open conflict or contain ongoing local conflicts until main defense force mobilization and deployment is achieved. Employment in UN-sponsored peacekeeping or cease-fire monitoring roles as well as in humanitarian operations -inside and outside ACE territory- should also be considered feasible and trained properly. To increase its credibility and reliability, the RRF should have a permanent order of battle with the Commander, the Command staff framework and some mechanized/armored Divisions provided by one "leading" nation. The multinationality would be sufficiently guaranteed by the presence of other multinational Divisions and rotational key positions in the staff. The approach of a British-led RRF, as agreed by NATO with the May 1991 DPC decision, is logical. It takes into consideration the strategic "weight" of Great Britain within the European pillar (only country with nuclear weapons in the military structure), and justifies to both the British and German population the forward presence of British forces on continental Europe; further, it serves a lot to help overcome the historical British reluctance to surrender some degree of its own sovereignty.

- A number of multinational main defense Corps, to which the most of the other units (active and reserve components) with a NATO commitment should be assigned.

Of course, such formations will require time to achieve a

satisfactory integrated operational efficiency. The main challenges will focus on: (1) corps and divisional troops (right mix, between the countries concerned, of the units necessary to enable the corps headquarters and the multinational divisions headquarters to function, communicate, and give combat and combat service support to subordinate units; (2) command and control; (3) interoperability of national communication and information systems; (4) logistic support.⁴⁰ But, as said before, the "multinationality" political aspect is of much greater importance than the military one. The lack of massive immediate military threat give us the time; what we need is firm political commitment, military cooperation, capacity to compromise, and patience.

Within WEU

Multinational European military formations, within WEU, may appear a duplication of efforts, since similar forces are already being formed within NATO. In fact, the issue is very sensitive and needs thorough investigation.

The creation of a WEU Rapid Reaction Corps, repeatedly proposed by Willem van Eekelen (Secretary General of the Western European Union), has been recently stressed by two initiatives taken first by Great Britain and Italy, and, then, by France together with Germany. The British-Italian declaration, issued on 4 October 1991, proposed that the WEU should develop a European Reaction Force, capable of responding flexibly in a range of possible circumstances outside the NATO area of operations or sphere of competence. The principles behind this declaration were

"that any reference to a European defense identity or a European defense policy need to be married absolutely to the Atlantic Alliance, that the security of Western Europe rests on that Alliance and we should not regard it as something temporary or superfluous with which we can dispense."⁴¹ Essentially, this position reflects the solution WEU as "strategic bridge" between EC and NATO. The Franco-German statement, later signed also from Spain, was issued on 16 October 1991 and called for the creation of a joint army corps of up 50.000 men, on the base of the existing combined brigade. This force, to which other WEU countries are invited to assign proper troops, would serve as the Community's defense arm independent from NATO (at least, from the French standpoint).

The French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas has declared that "linking such vastly different plans will be like marrying fire and water".⁴² Are the differences so extreme or is a compromise between the two proposals possible and necessary, as part of the overall process of European integration?.

The British have argued that the creation of the WEU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) is "useless and dangerous".⁴³ It is dangerous because Great Britain shares the U.S. fear that any development of WEU into an efficient military organization may deprive NATO of one of its "raisons d'être". Also, U.K. favors the process of European economic integration, but resists --as it always did in the past-- the extension of political integration up to a common defence and security policy. The WEU RRF is considered useless because it is

seen as just a duplication of what NATO is already doing. In this regard, U.K. prefers the option of a unique NATO "double-hat" RRF, where elements of it could be put under a WEU flag for operations outside the NATO Treaty area (within and beyond Europe). This option would imply an easy solution of the out-of-area issue, that has been a dispute since 1949.

An extension of the Alliance role beyond its geographical boundaries is supported by two recent events: the Gulf War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In fact, the NATO out-of-area operations have always been a "taboo", excluded even by serious discussions, principally because every intervention of NATO troops outside the Treaty area was supposed to draw --because of the presence of U.S. units-- the immediate involvement of the Soviet Union. Now, this danger has disappeared together with the dissolution of USSR. The Gulf War, with the silent support of the Soviet Union or --at least-- the absence of any risk of confrontation, brings new strength to this interpretation. U.S., British and Italian NATO "assigned" troops have been sent to the Persian Gulf, with the full support of other member states. French ground and air forces have not only strictly cooperated with the Allied NATO troops, but have accepted U.S. operational control, showing that when vital interests are at stake, traditional, mutual bias can be set apart.

On the other hand, the Gulf War may also be considered a unique and ideal case from the point of view of anyone wishing to encourage a military out-of-area NATO role. This because of the

threat involved (world oil market) and the grotesque and blatant Iraqi aggression. In future contingencies, the interests of the European Allies are more likely to differ from those of the U.S., due to fundamentally different dependance on overseas trade and overseas sources of energy and resources as well as different political approaches.⁴⁴

Also if the recent Alliance's new strategic concept has recognized, for the first time, that "NATO security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and acts of terrorism and sabotage", the critical out-of-area dispute can not be considered resolved.⁴⁵ A proof of that, if even necessary, is given by the fact that the only paragraph of NATO document MC-400 "New Military Strategy", that has still to be agreed upon, regards that subject.

The out-of-area question is not the only problem that hinders the implementation of the NATO "double-hat" RRF proposal. First, France and Spain are not members of the integrated NATO military structure. Although there have recently been signals of an increased French participation in NATO military activities --such as the decision to join the NATO Strategic Review Group-- France does not intend, for the time being, to return to the integrated military command organization. Second, if WEU is to be transformed --in the long run-- into the defense component of the European Community, the foundations of military integration have to be laid now, since the problems to overcome are many and complex. Further,

no West European defense entity can be complete without France and, to a lesser extent, without Spain.

So long as these constraints persist, the best solution is to agree a compromise that could maintain NATO as the acknowledged "center of gravity", while strengthening the process of defense European integration. The French-British contrast is only one example of the many politically different standpoints, on strategic security issues, that have divided France from the U.S.-Great Britain axis in the last twenty five years (since the exit of France from the NATO integrated military structure in 1966). It seems more a problem of leadership in Europe or of greater or lesser dependance from the U.S., than a problem of European security. The argument should receive less attention than the fundamental question whether to continue to deal with out-of-area contingencies on an "ad-hoc" basis --as was always the case in the past-- or to have a standing European rapid deployment force to take care of them. The extreme uncertainty that will dominate the political relations in Central, Southeastern and Eastern Europe for the next decades, the unresolved contrasts in Middle East, and a new consciousness of the role of Western Europe outside the continent, are all clear elements that favor the first approach. The real problems focus on force structure, leadership and clearly defined missions.

The line to follow should be pragmatic and take into consideration the following points: (1) A French leadership role in the WEU RRF could compensate France for better co-operation on NATO

issues. (2) In an era of fundamental transition and great uncertainty, every attempt to draw France closer to NATO military structure and to help maintain the Alliance's political cohesion is clever and appreciable. (3) France has considerable experience deploying forces outside Europe. (4) The WEU RRF could easily incorporate units of the French "Force d'Action Rapide" (FAR), created and trained to provide a hard-hitting mobile force for both European and Third World operations, and the binational French-German Brigade.

Based on these considerations, the French-German proposal appears cost-effective and should receive broad support, in order to be worked out with the urgency that the ongoing "revolution" in East Europe suggests. The force could build upon the existing joint Brigade and expand to the size of an Army Corps of up to 50,000-70,000 men, with the further contribution of the two countries and units at brigade level assigned by other WEU states. Careful consideration should be given to already existing rapid reaction units, such as the Italian "Forza di Intervento Rapido" (FIR, two Brigades), the Spanish Army "Fuerza de Accion Rapida" (FAR, two Brigades), and the Portuguese Army's Airborne Brigade.

EC countries not included in WEU (Greece, Denmark, and Ireland) should also be asked to participate, "earmarking" units to be attached to the main force in particular contingencies and when so agreed upon. In the French-led WEU RRF Headquarters, together with personnel of all EC countries, also officers of the NATO nations (except Iceland that does not have armed forces) not

members of the EC (U.S., Canada, Turkey, and Norway) should be represented with liaison/observer status. A WEU military planning staff should also be established, to be located in Brussel and to work in strict concert with the similar SACEUR staff, being formed for the overall planning of the NATO RRF. These measures should put the premises to establish a WEU military force that would eventually become, in the long run, the Community's defense arm, without damaging NATO.

Further and more consistent links with the Atlantic Alliance should be guaranteed by the "double-hatting" of forces of all the WEU RRF contributing countries, comprised in the NATO integrated military structure. In fact, the units "assigned" to the WEU multinational force by Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and those eventually earmarked by Greece and Denmark should be substantially the same committed to the NATO RRF, with some exceptions for Great Britain. Another trans-Atlantic link would derive by the fact that the employment of the WEU RRF, outside Europe, can not be effective without U.S. support, in the fields of strategic airlift and sealift as well as technical intelligence means, including satellites.

The mentioned duplication of efforts (between the NATO and WEU RRFs) will be limited to the establishment of the multinational WEU RRF Headquarters in France and of a small WEU planning staff in Brussel. For the creation of the similar NATO RRF Command and Control structures, existing resources can be easily utilized. The cost would be compensated by a greater degree of flexibility; this

will permit the assignment of forces to various possible authorities in terms of operational control, with national leaders deciding case by case which line of command activate (NATO, WEU, national, ad hoc or even a UN mandate). Most importantly, the creation of WEU multinational forces would finally remove the political constraints that have prevented so far a timely Western European support to U.S. initiatives outside Europe. Actually, French conscripts are not allowed to serve outside metropolitan France and no German soldier can, by constitution, be employed outside the NATO area. The removal of such hindrances alone would represent for the U.S. a clear signal that the so far frustrating issue of American solicitations of out-of-area help from the European allies is being overcome.

Within the CSCE

Ten former republics of the Soviet Union, now independent States, have obtained full CSCE membership on January 31, 1992. The same may happen in the near future for Georgia, Slovenia, Croatia and, eventually, other republics of the post-Yugoslavia. The radical increase of "national opinions" is likely to slow down the process of institutionalization of this already complex organization. The creation of a pan-European Security Council, formed by U.S., Russia, France, Germany, and Great Britain, remain however possible and should be pursued.

With regard to the concept of military multinationality, this could remain in the most vague terms, meaning simply the "earmarking" of units at battalion level and not assigned "a

"priori" to any Command, for peace-keeping operations within Europe. The cooperation could be increased with the creation of an international School where officers of all CSCE members could be trained about the particular procedures regulating the employment of UN forces and, eventually, with the organization and development of combined exercises. These simple actions could help foster the process of integration of the new political entities into the pan-European context and dissolve fears of isolation. Of course, any military intervention would continue to take place under UN mandate but Europe could speak one voice and act according to previously agreed patterns. The organization and dispatch of peace-keeping units is usually hampered by concerns of nation participation, costs, and force sizing. An "earmarked" trans-atlantic force under the direction of the pan-European Security Council would minimize these problems and increase the likelihood of timely deployment. And anyway, in peace-keeping operations in Yugoslavia or in East Europe (e.g. Moldavia) would it not be better to employ soldiers that share common values and stem from democracies instead of African units that come from countries led by dictators?

CONCLUSION

The challenge of victory can be nearly as demanding as the traumas of defeat.¹⁶

The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of communism have transformed the Cold War period into a more uncertain, complex, and possibly less stable situation. Communist

rule did not eliminate any regional and ethnic conflicts; it only acted as a constraint. Moreover, it has ruined the economy and brought millions of people to the edge of starvation. With its collapse and the re-nationalization of politics in a number of states, many of these disputes have re-emerged. In the Balkan Peninsula Serbs fight Croatians. Inside the borders of the former Soviet empire, historic ethnic and racial disputes threaten to plunge the new Commonwealth of Independent States into chaos.

On the other side of the continent, Western Europe moves slowly toward greater integration and multilateral coordination. The process is slowed down by persisting, diverging perceptions about the future roles of EC, NATO, and WEU. The United Kingdom continues its historical policy of special partnership with the United States, supporting the ally and NATO, at the expense of greater Western European integration. France and Spain, which remain outside the NATO integrated military structure, tend to give priority to a common defense and security policy within the EC, which involves transforming the WEU into its military arm.

Despite all these concerns there is reason for optimism. The evolution of the old threat towards a set of uncertainties and instabilities, more complex but less dangerous from a military point of view, allows Western Europe to pursue a more united role with relative calm, in the security framework guaranteed by NATO.

The Atlantic Alliance remains as vital today for European security as it was forty-five years ago, but the out-of-area concerns are not yet resolved. On the other hand, while the Soviet

Union disappears, the out-of-area issues, inside and beyond Europe, become more salient. On the continent, without any coordinated economic aid, accompanied and supported --when necessary-- by firm military interventions, there is the high probability of endemic ethnic strife, local conflicts, flows of refugees. These events will inevitably slow down the democratization process and deteriorate an already precarious economic situation. The increasingly unequal distribution of wealth will create another division between West and East, an area of prosperity versus an area of poverty. To meet these risks properly, there is a need of full political consensus between Western Europe and U.S..

The United States should accept a greater European influence in the Alliance's decision-making process, as a logical consequence of the withdrawal of most of its troops from Germany and of the increasing role of the EC as a fully "political subject," with an important voice not only in economic but also security issues. Hence, the U.S. should assist rather than resist the development of an efficient military arm in the WEU with a double role: the European pillar within NATO and the European instrument for military operations in NATO out-of-area or out-of-competence contingencies. Consequently, the countries of Western Europe should contribute more equitably to global security, in a way commensurate with the importance of the interests at stake (such as peace and stability in the oil-rich Persian Gulf as well as in Central and Eastern Europe) and with the size of their economies. To reach this goal Western Europe should speak one voice within all the existing

organizations (NATO, EC, WEU). Because of persisting different national standpoints, the process of integration in political and security matters will be gradual. But no doubt, it should remain irreversible.

In this context, while the grand strategies are being designed, the creation of multinational forces can: (1) within NATO, constitute the glue that substitutes for the ex-Soviet threat in keeping the Alliance's cohesion intact; (2) within WEU, boost the process of European integration, both in political and military terms, and bring France closer to NATO activities. It is not by chance that the definition of force structures within NATO and WEU appear to precede the fashioning of the new grand strategies, in what seems a reversal of military logic. First of all, drawing up force structure designs is much easier , in an era of epochal transition and extraordinary revolution, than reaching full political consensus and identity of interests. More importantly, the constitution of multinational formations is the pragmatic means to transform the theory of "common values" and "common security interests" into something concrete. While the security arrangements are being restructured, the "military multinationality" represents the practical instrument to break the rhetoric of collective security and to translate it into the substance of burden-sharing.

ENDNOTES

¹ One proponent of the pessimistic side is John Mearsheimer: "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security (Summer 1990), 1-56.

² For a review of the arguments between optimists and pessimists see: (1) Stephen Van Evera: "Primed for Peace. Europe After the Cold War", International Security (Winter 1990/91), 7-9 and (2) Charles A. Kupchan: "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe", International Security (Summer 1991), 114-115.

³ John Lewis Gaddis: "Toward the post Cold-War World", Foreign Affairs (Spring 1991), 102-122.

⁴ Stephen Van Evera, 9.

⁵ George Bush: National Security Strategy of the United States (August 1991), V.

⁶ Don Oberdorfer, "Bush Hails Change, Praises ex Leader", The Washington Post, 26 December 1991, A 35.

⁷ Stephen Van Evera, 48.

⁸ Il Corriere della Sera, 3 December 1991, 3.

⁹ Franco Venturini, "Le divisioni della liberta'", Corriere della Sera, 11 September 1991, 1 and 3.

¹⁰ Michael Dobbs, "Unified Control Set for Soviet A-Arms", The Washington Post, 31 December 1991, A 12.

¹¹ Ibid, A 1.

¹² John E. Yong, "U.S. Recognizes Russia, 5 Others", The Washington Post, 24 December 1991, A 1.

¹³ For the purpose of this study Central Europe comprises Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Southeastern Europe: Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece. Eastern Europe: the three new Baltic States and the other sovereign states that have originated from the disintegration of the Soviet Union, such as Byelorussia, Ukraine, Moldavia, and Russia.

¹⁴ For a report of the first steps of the Pentagonal see FBIS-WEU-90-79, 14 September 1991, 1-4.

¹⁵ Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses. Change and Instability in the Balkans", International Security (Winter 1990/1991), 71-72.

¹⁶ Quoted by Marc Fisher, "Germany's New Destiny", The Washington Post, 18 September 1991, A 27.

¹⁷ Eckart Arnold, "The Price of German Unification", International Affairs 67, I (1991), 463.

¹⁸ Steven P. Kramer, "The French Question", The Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1991), 91.

¹⁹ The Washington Post, 17 October 1991, A 1 and A 40.

²⁰ Stefano Silvestri, "Il Futuro dell'Alleanza Atlantica", Mondo Operaio, November 1990, 7-8.

²¹ Ibid., 8.

²² Kurt Campbell and Thomas Weiss, "The Third World After Eastern Europe", The Washington Quarterly (Spring 1991), 98.

²³ Survey of Current Affairs (December 1990), 417-420.

²⁴ For a summary of the key events in the evolution of the EC see Gary C. Hufbauer, "Europe 1992: an American Perspective", 51-52.

²⁵ Quoted by Alan Riding, "Measured Steps Toward One Europe: What Was Decided", The New York Times, 12 December 1991, A 18.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ See A. H. Robertson, "The Council of Europe: its Structure, Functions and Achievements", 1-9.

²⁸ Survey of Current Affairs (July 1990), .

²⁹ See FBIS-WEU-91-217, 8 November 1991, 1-4 and FBIS-WEU-91-218, 12 November 1991, 1-3.

³⁰ For a complete historical background of the WEU see Alfred Cohen, "The Western European Union and NATO", Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries No. 2.

³¹ See David S. Yost, "France and West European Defense Identity", Survival (July/August 1991), 336.

³² Douglas T. Stuart, "Can NATO Trascend Its Europeans Borders? NATO Out of Area Disputes", Strategic Studies Institute (USAWC), 13.

³³ Charles A. Kupchan, 156.

³⁴ Michael Lind, "Mission Impossible", Global Affairs (Fall 1991), 154.

³⁵ See David S. Yost, France and West European Defense Identity", Survival (July/August 1991), 332.

³⁶ See Brigitte Schalte, The Future of Trans-Atlantic Relations", ROA National Security Report, December 1991, 40.

³⁷ See Jan Zielonka, "Europe's Security: a Great Confusion", International Affairs 67, I (1991), 134.

³⁸ See Thomas-Durell Young, "The Case for U.S. Participation in NATO Multinational Corps", Strategic Studies Institute (USAWC), 7.

³⁹ Stefano Silvestri, "Il Futuro dell'Alleanza Atlantica", Mondo Operaio, November 1990, 17.

⁴⁰ For details see David Miller, "The Proposed NATO Rapid Reaction Corps", NATO Sixteen Nations (December 1991), 28-32.

⁴¹ Survey of Current Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 11, November 1991, 401.

⁴² Charles Goldsmith, "Nuclear Free Europe?", Europe (November 1991), 11.

⁴³ William Drozdiak, "Germans, French Plan Joint Force", The Washington Post, 17 October 1991, 40.

⁴⁴ Douglas T. Stuart, "Can NATO Transcend Its European Borders? NATO Out-of-Area Disputes", Strategic Studies Institute (USAWC), 13.

⁴⁵ For a different evaluation, see Robert R. Ulin, "Recent Key Documents on European Security", SSI Special Report, Strategic Studies Institute (USAWC), 13.

⁴⁶ Quoted by Jan Zielonka, "Europe's Security: a Great Confusion", International Affairs 67, I (1991), 137.

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